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The 50th Anniversary marking the conclusion of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Warren Court period, which lasted from 1953-1969, offers a timely opportunity to
reflect on this Court’s important legacy on due process rights. Scholars credit the
Warren Court with a constitutional due process revolution that sought to expand
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procedural rights available to criminal defendants.3 The Warren Court’s criminal
due process revolution has generated significant reflections on its impact, both
positive and negative, on the criminal justice system. We seize this opportunity
instead to conduct an assessment of the Warren Court’s impact on the
constitutional due process rights of immigrants.
There are at least two important reasons why this analysis matters. First, it
provides an opportunity to reflect on the critique that has been made repeatedly,
but not quite heard: that the asymmetrical procedural due process rights between
criminal defendants and immigrants facing immigration enforcement is hard to
justify given the symmetry in the punitive function and methods between criminal
and immigration law.4 Interestingly, the Warren Court period was a time when the
expansion of rights for criminal defendants increased the divergence in the nature
and scope of procedural due process rights available to immigrants as compared to
criminal defendants. In contrast to criminal defendants, the Warren Court was
entirely silent, for instance, on whether the right to remain silent or the right to
counsel should apply similarly to immigrants. Yet, an analysis of the immigration
cases decided during the Warren Court period–and the historical context in which
these were decided–suggests that the justification for these differing results cannot
rest on an explanation that immigrants were not facing significant harms arising
from immigration enforcement’s harsh hand. Indeed, 1953 to 1969 was an
especially bellic period in the United States and included such wars as the Vietnam
War and the Cold War. Unsurprisingly, the government’s tendency to restrict the
due process rights of immigrants by relying on war powers, whether these wars are
real or constructed,5 functioned extremely well during this period. Especially
during the Cold War, the government sought, inter alia, to exclude or to deport
noncitizens based on secret evidence or to deny naturalization based on ideological

3. See, e.g., Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal
Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 525. For cases expanding the due process rights of criminal defendants during the
Warren Court, see, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227
(1967) (defendant has right to counsel at post-indictment line-up); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965)
(Fifth Amendment forbids both comment by prosecution on defendant’s refusal to testify and instructions to jury
that defendant’s trial silence is evidence of guilt); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963) (indigent
entitled to appointed counsel at state mandatory appeal stage); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18–19 (1956)
(indigent defendant has right to obtain free trial transcripts in order to ensure adequate appellate review); Stovall
v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (due process mandates exclusion of out-of-court identification based on
unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407–08 (1965) (defendant has
constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses at trial); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–91
(1963) (prosecutor has duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to defendant at trial); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
398–99, 435 (1963) (federal courts retain power to decide merits of federal constitutional claim despite state
procedural forfeiture of claim unless defendant deliberately bypassed state opportunity to raise claim).
4. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of
Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007).
5. See, e.g., Robert S. Chang, Whitewashing Precedent: From the Chinese Exclusion Case to Korematsu
to the Muslim Travel Ban Cases, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1183 (2018); see also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia,
Business as Usual: Immigration Law and the National Security Exception, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1485, 1512–13
(2010).
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grounds without adequate procedural safeguards.6 It was not that the Warren Court
was entirely unsympathetic to immigrant’s plight. Indeed, the cases decided during
this period reveal a mixed record of outcomes, with the Court vacillating between
complete deference to the government and a few interventions to rein in
immigration’s exceptionalism. The latter was particularly true in cases involving
long-term permanent residents and those seeking to naturalize or faced loss of
citizenship.7 But, especially in contrast to the bold steps (regarded as misguided by
some)8 that the Court took to advance the rights of criminal defendants, even the
decisions that sometimes favored immigrants cannot be characterized as anything
other than meek.
War’s exceptionalism and the Warren Court’s reluctance to meddle too much
in all war cases could offer a different explanation for these results.9 Yet, we must
mention that the nebulous contours and dubious legality of the Cold War could
have provided a prime opportunity to challenge the illegitimate conflation of
immigration and war powers that has too often characterized the expansion of the
immigration enforcement power.10 Moreover, the Warren Court also decided a
sufficient number of immigration cases with hardly any linkages to war that also
did not lead to revolutionary or bold decisions.11 Undoubtedly, for the Warren
Court to create due process rights for immigrants during this time would have been
equally, if not more, revolutionary as its criminal due process revolution, albeit in
different ways. In the criminal context—aside from strong critiques against the
nature of the rights themselves12—the Warren Court’s perceived significant
departures in the construction of new rights for criminal defendants from both
federalism and separation of powers principles especially fueled the critique by
opponents and proponents alike for going too far, at least too soon.13 At the time,
the imposition of the federal constitution on the state policing function–even when
6. See infra Part I.A.
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86
GEO. L.J. 1153, 1153–54 (1998) (acknowledging that the Court’s 1960’s criminal procedure cases were designed
to eradicate an “American apartheid” regime, but asserting that this doctrine has “outlived [its] utility” and urging
the implementation of a new doctrine that recognizes the legitimate function of discretionary policing techniques
and the competence of inner-city communities to protect themselves from abusive police power); see also CRAIG
BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION 37–56 (1993).
9. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Elias, Red Monday and Its Aftermath: The Supreme Court’s Flip-Flop Over
Communism in the Late 1950s, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 207 (2014) (discussing Cold War cases that contrasted with
the Warren Court’s civil rights legacy); see also Michal R. Belknap, The Warren Court and the Vietnam War:
The Limits of Legal Liberalism, 33 GA. L. REV. 65, 66 (1998) (arguing that the Warren Court displayed little
appetite for activism and policy-making during the Vietnam War).
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. See infra Part I.B.
12. See, e.g., George C. Thomas III, The Criminal Procedure Road Not Taken: Due Process and the
Protection of Innocence, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 197 (2005); see also Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions
of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Court’s Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L. J. 18 (1983).
13. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Everything Old is New Again: Fundamental Fairness and the Legitimacy
of Criminal Justice, 3 OHIO. ST. J. CRIM. L. 105, 105 (2005); see also Darryl K. Brown, The Warren Court,
Criminal Procedure, and Retributive Punishment, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1411, 1412 (2002).
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some states were already moving in similar directions–and its creation of the
exclusionary remedy for violations to these new rights outside the legislative
process were significant departures that raised questions of legitimacy for some or
of ripeness for others.14 In the context of immigration law, even without similar
federalism concerns, the recognition of a right to counsel or the right to bail–to
name a few–would also have been seismic in different ways given immigration
law’s treatment as civil at a time when very few constitutional substantive and
procedural due process rights were recognized in the civil context.15 It is important
to remember that while the Warren Court coincided with the Civil Rights
Movement (1940s–1960s), it also ended at a time when new rights grounded in
equal protection, including for immigrants, were just starting to emerge.16
Similarly, the expansions of substantive constitutional rights to recognize liberty
interests in certain public benefits17 or family,18 and which the stakes doctrine19
later applied to the immigration context, also occurred post the Warren Court
period. Indeed, this evolution of expanded rights and its impact on immigrants
even led several scholars to predict at the turn of the last century that immigration’s
exceptionalism was finally here.20
Secondly, viewing the current state of immigrants’ due process rights through
the lens of the Warren Court provides an opportunity to reexamine the treatment

14. See, e.g., id.; see also Ruth W. Grant, The Exclusionary Rule and the Meaning of Separation of Powers,
14 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 173, 183 (1991).
15. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice, 5 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 5,
9 (1993).
16. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional
Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1998).
17. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holding that classifications based on alien status
are inherently suspect and a statute that denies welfare benefits to noncitizens and restricts benefits to longtime
residents violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 102
S. Ct. 2977 (1982) (holding that because Congress specifically allowed the respondents, who were nonimmigrants
with G-4 visas, to acquire domicile, the State’s policy denying in-state status to the respondents on account of
their G-4 status violated the Supremacy Clause); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999) (holding
that a statute that mandated residency requirements of a certain duration before becoming entitled to receive
benefits violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause because it improperly discriminated against citizens on
the basis of their length of residency).
18. See, e.g., Deana Pollard Sacks, Elements of Liberty, 61 SMU L. REV. 1552, 15791557 (2008); see also
C. Quince Hopkins, The Supreme Court’s Family Law Doctrine Revisited: Insights from Social Science on Family
Structures and Kinship Change in the United States, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431, 447 (2004).
19. See, e.g., Angela M. Banks, Deporting Families: Legal Matter or Political Question?, 27 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 489, 553 (2011); see also Robert Pauw, Plenary Power: An Outmoded Doctrine that Should Not Limit
IIRIRA Reform, 51 EMORY L. J. 1095, 1095 (2002).
20. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Prediction for
Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 282–83 (2000); see
also Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicial and
Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 34 (1999); Peter J.
Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 339 (2002). For skepticism about the
claim that the end of the plenary power doctrine was imminent, see Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Immigration
Law and Enforcement: A Response to Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289, 289–90
(2000).
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of immigrants in the United States through the evolution of law during the past
fifty years. For example, after the Warren Court period, the important legal gains
of the Civil Rights Movement took hold and influenced the development of
equality principles and other substantive rights for immigrants.21 The peace that
followed the Warren Court period, at least until the War on Terror took hold,
provided an opportunity for deep reflection and some reckoning on whether courts
should defer so much, especially as to wars like the Cold War, that are ill-defined
and prone to abuses of power. This conversation, too, led to critiques on the
dangers of treating immigration law as an exercise of war powers or foreign affairs
with some important gains in rights for immigrants.22 Yet, high levels of antiimmigrant sentiment that arose in the 1990s led to substantial contraction of public
benefits for immigrants and the significant expansion of criminal measures as
immigration enforcement through new federal laws.23 Whatever few gains were
had in the courts to push back against these measures were halted immediately
with the September 11, 2001 attacks and the ensuing war on terror which applied
fiercely to immigrants.24 Since then, with few exceptions, federal immigration laws
and their enforcement have been harshly punitive to immigrants. Given that the
Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution had little impact on the rights of
immigrants at the time, it is perhaps ironic that the Warren Court’s due process
revolution is now pushing back against what many scholars now label as
“crimmigration.”25 Another critical development arising from the post-September
11 era is the explosion of a new immigration federalism. This wave of immigration
federalism, which is as varied as it is vast, has included push back against the
unforgiving federal punitive machinery against immigrants in ways that also recall
the Warren Court’s important values of privacy and liberty that guided its criminal
due process revolution.26
At the University of the Pacific Law Review Symposium titled “The Warren
Court’s Criminal Procedure Revolution: a 50 year Retrospective,” held October
11, 2019,27 much of the commentary around the legacy of the Warren Court’s due
process revolution was somber for very legitimate reasons.28 Yet, a retrospection
of this important due process revolution through an immigration lens elucidates
lessons perhaps overlooked. Foremost, by expanding the universe of the laws,

21. See infra Part II.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Infra Part II.
25. Infra Part II.
26. Infra Part II.
27. See Event Details, University of the Pacific Law Review Symposium, available at
https://calendar.pacific.edu/event/university_of_the_pacific_law_review_symposium.
28. George C. Thomas III, The Warren Court, Idealism, and the 1960s, 51 U. PAC. L. REV. 843 (2020);
William Pizzi, The Failure of the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 51 U. PAC. L. REV. 823 (2020); Gabriel J. Chin
& Hannah Bogen, Warren Court Incrementalism and Indigent Criminal Appellants’ Right to Trial Transcripts,
51 U. PAC. L. REV. 667 (2020).

637

2020 / Warren Court’s Due Process Revolution Through the Lens of Immigrants
people, and context we consider to evaluate the Warren Court’s criminal due
process legacy, we glean that it is much broader than initially imagined; indeed,
broader than it was intended even by the Warren Court itself. Moreover, this legacy
is perhaps not quite finished in the area of immigration law. At least, we foresee
that the crimmigration crisis and the immigration federalism wave could still yield
an unintended and unimagined due process revolution for immigrants that is long
overdue. We proceed in this essay in two principal parts. In Part I, we provide a
historical context to the immigration cases decided during the Warren Court and
contrast the few due process gains that immigrants enjoyed compared to criminal
defendants. In Part II, we expand on the important immigration law developments
fifty years post-the Warren Court through the lens of the Warren criminal due
process revolution.
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND THE IMMIGRATION LAW PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS CASES DURING THE WARREN COURT
A. The Historical Context
When President Eisenhower appointed Earl Warren as Chief Justice in October
1953, the United States had just extracted itself from a “hot war” on the Korean
Peninsula but remained deeply entangled in a Cold War around the globe. Indeed,
throughout much of the twentieth century, the United States found itself involved
in large-scale and undeclared wars, professing to fight for its democratic principles.
This nearly constant state of war has had significant repercussions in American
politics and for the administration of justice. Judicial deference to the “political
departments” in the regulation of immigration, however, did not originate during
a twentieth-century war but during an equally tumultuous period in the previous
century.
The authority of Congress to regulate immigration initially derived from the
Commerce Clause.29 However, regulating immigration was not an issue either the
framers of the Constitution or antebellum administrations concerned themselves
with as millions of immigrants from Europe and internal migrants from older
eastern cities moved in to occupy the trans-Appalachian West.30 Immigrants from
Europe were welcomed (primarily by the states which competed with one another
to attract new residents) and, in fact, desperately needed in the new nation. There
was little fear that immigrants could not successfully integrate into the growing
nation, and the need for farmers to occupy western territory the U.S. claimed as its
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and
the Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 9 (2010).
30. DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN, 1815–
1848, 136–42 (2007). In 1790, Congress passed a Naturalization Act that restricted citizenship to “free white
persons.” In 1798, the Federalist government, led by President John Adams, passed the Alien and Sedition Acts
as “national security” measures meant to silence critics of the “quasi-war” with France, many of whom were
thought to be immigrants. However, by the time the law expired in 1800, no immigrant had been deported.
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own and laborers to operate the machinery of an industrializing nation was
insatiable. However, by the end of the nineteenth century, Congress took a more
active role in proscribing who would be allowed entry into the United States. In
these efforts, Congress found a deferential partner in the federal judiciary that
articulated the legal premise of “immigration exceptionalism,” which based the
power to exclude or deport individuals on a nation’s inherent sovereignty, wrapped
in “an urgent and pervasive discourse of national self-preservation.”31
Legal scholars and historians alike recognize the Chinese Exclusion Act of
1882 as the turning point in American immigration history which transformed the
United States from a nation with an “open door” to a “gatekeeping nation.”32 The
initial forays into restricting immigration from Asia came from the Workingmen’s
Party in California that expressed their racist anger at foreign competition for jobs
first through violence and then through legislation.33 Despite the fact that state and
local laws that attempted to strip Chinese residents of their right to vote, work, and
enter the country were struck down by the courts as unconstitutional, the furor
created by anti-Chinese advocates led Congress to take up the issue and eventually
renegotiate a treaty with China that led to the Exclusion Act.34 The 1882 law barred
the entry of Chinese laborers into the United States and required any Chinese
worker who previously resided in the U.S. to obtain a certificate of reentry should
they leave the country and wish to return.
Although the first case that appeared before the Supreme Court in 1884
challenging the Exclusion Act resulted in a favorable decision for the plaintiff, by
1889, the Court firmly established the plenary power of Congress with respect to
immigration.35 Without dissent, Justice Field wrote in Chae Chan Ping v. United
States that the plaintiff represented “a menace to our civilization,” and therefore,
by the terms of the treaty with China, Congress acted within its authority to
“regulate, limit, or suspend such coming or residence” of Chinese laborers.36 In
recounting the history of the Chinese in post-Gold Rush California, Field echoed
some of the rhetoric of the Workingmen’s Party about the steadily increasing
31. Lindsay, supra note 27, at 31–32.
32. ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA’S GATES: CHINESE IMMIGRATION DURING THE EXCLUSION ERA, 1882–1943,
4–7 (2003); ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR: AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY AND
IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1882 2 (2004); MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA 3 (2004).
33. PHILIP J. ETHINGTON, THE PUBLIC CITY: THE POLITICAL CONSTRUCTION OF URBAN LIFE IN SAN
FRANCISCO, 1850 –1900, 267–81 (1994); WILLIAM ISSEL AND ROBERT W. CHERNY, SAN FRANCISCO, 1865–
1932: POLITICS, POWER, AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, 125–30 (1986).
34. Lindsay, supra note 27, at 30; Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 550 (1990).
35. In 1884, the Court ruled in favor of Chew Heong who had arrived in San Francisco in 1880 but departed
for Honolulu before the 1882 law took effect. Upon his return, he was initially denied entrance because he failed
to obtain the required certificate of reentry before he left California. However, because he departed before that
provision was enacted, the Court ruled, he could not reasonably have been expected to fulfill the requirement and
thus carved out an exception to exclusion for those Chinese who had departed before 1882 but wished to return.
Lindsay, supra note 27, at 29–32; Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 538 (1884).
36. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 626 (1889).
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economic threat they posed–such as the lack of families they brought with them to
support, their ability to subsist on “the simplest fare”–and the “differences of race”
with white Americans. However, the legal basis upholding exclusion was on the
grounds of national sovereignty and security.37 The Court’s framing of exclusion
as “protective legislation” from the “great danger” of “an Oriental invasion,” made
the actions of Congress an exercise in national sovereignty, which the Constitution
delegated to the “political departments” of the federal government.38
This “plenary power doctrine,” thus refers to the power of Congress to regulate
immigration without much practical restraint by the Constitution and “subject to
extraordinary judicial deference.”39 Furthermore, Justice Field made the point that
this authority based on national security interests did not require the United States
to be involved in an actual conflict to invoke:
To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign
aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation,
and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be
subordinated. It matters not in what form such aggression and
encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its
national character, or from vast hordes of its people crowding in
upon. . .Their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time
there are no actual hostilities with the nation of which the
foreigners are subjects.40
Thus, the government could preemptively invoke the rational of national security
and–as discussed below–utilized it throughout the twentieth century.
The Supreme Court extended its national sovereignty logic and judicial
deference in 1892 when it denied the habeas corpus suit of Nishimura Ekiu, a
Japanese woman seeking entry into the United States.41 An immigration official at
the Port of San Francisco refused her entry per the Immigration Act of 1891 that
prohibited entry to any person “likely to become a public charge.” In upholding
her exclusion, the Court ruled Nishimura was not entitled to a hearing where she
might examine or question the evidence used to determine her status. Additionally,
the Court ruled that because immigration regulation was an inherent power of
Congress based on the principle of national sovereignty, whatever procedures and
decisions made by immigration officials in carrying out the laws of Congress were
final and not subject to judicial review.42
37. Id.; see also Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and
National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1867–681832 (2007); Lindsay, supra note 27, at 40.
38. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 631 (1889); Shawn E. Fields, The Unreviewable
Executive? National Security and the Limits of Plenary Power, 84 TENN. L. REV. 731, 747752 (2017).
39. Lindsay, supra 27.
40. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 630 (1889); Fields, supra note 36, at 748.
41. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 12 S. Ct. 340336 (1992).
42. Motomura, supra note 32, at 552. Jennifer M. Chacón notes, however, that the denial of due process
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Congress flexed its plenary power muscle almost immediately after entering
the Great War with the Espionage Act of 1917. President Woodrow Wilson
(elected first in 1912) tried hard to keep the United States out of the conflagration
that was consuming Europe. During his reelection campaign in 1916, he ran on the
boast that he had kept the U.S. out of war. However, when Germany continued to
make hostile gestures towards the U.S., he asked Congress for a declaration of war
in April 1917. The war was deeply unpopular with numerous Americans who felt
it was not their fight and saw no advantage in participating in the indiscriminate
slaughter of modern warfare.43
Wilson was well aware of the resistance he might face in leading the nation to
war. However, once committed, he was determined to unite the nation around the
national emergency at hand and would not tolerate dissent. As early as 1915, in his
annual message to Congress, Wilson warned about the “gravest threats” to the
nation’s peace and safety that came from “those born under other flags but
welcomed under our generous naturalization laws to the full freedom and
opportunity of America.” He urged the use of “processes of law by which we may
be purged” of such malcontents.44 Thus, only two months after the U.S. declared
war, and many months before any American troops even saw combat, Congress
passed the Espionage Act. In short, the law made it illegal to undermine the
military’s operation or effectiveness.45
Such concerns were of particular importance as a result of the growing
popularity of socialists, anarchists, and pacifists, organizations that often drew
their supporters from labor radicals, ethnic or immigrant communities, and
minority political parties. The Postmaster General received broad authority to
prevent the mailing of literature from these groups who, despite very different
motivations, were unified in their opposition to the war.46 The anti-war
condemnation by these groups of the “warmongers” and “capitalists” that would
profit from U.S. involvement in the war contributed to increased distrust of
immigrants or so-called “hyphenated Americans.” By the time the Espionage and
Sedition Acts expired in 1921, more than two thousand people had been indicted

was not absolute, even if it proved grossly insufficient for most immigrant seeking redress. In the court’s decision
of the Yick Wo case in 1886, they affirmed that “‘aliens’ physically present in the United States,”—that is,
residents ineligible for citizenship—were entitled to the equal protections and due process guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Chacón, supra note 35, 1867–68; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
43. DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, 45–46 (25th
Anniv. ed., 2004).
44. ARTHUR H. GARRISON, SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE IN TIMES OF NATIONAL CRISIS, TERRORISM,
AND WAR 94 (2011).
45. Congress made it unlawful (1) to obtain military information on the national defense with the intent to
use such information to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, (2) to willfully
make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the
military or naval forces of the United States, (3) to promote the success of its enemies, (4) to cause or attempt to
cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or
(5) to willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States. Id. at 93.
46. Id. at 94; KENNEDY, supra note 41, at 26, 75–76.
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and half convicted.47 Because the Great War, which began in Europe in 1914, had
already begun slowing the rate of immigration to the U.S., many of the cases the
Court heard in the 1910s and early 1920s revolved around the power of Congress
and the President to regulate the economy and compel cooperation or service with
the war effort.48 In the cases challenging the constitutionality of the Espionage and
Sedition Acts, most failed to secure a reversal of a conviction and, in fact, by
establishing the “clear and present danger” test, “[wove] into the legal fabric of the
nation restrictions on freedom of speech that been unknown before 1917.”49
For the United States, the Great War lasted little more than eighteen months,
but the fear and loathing of political subversives had only just begun its halfcentury run in American politics and law. The first “Red Scare” began in mid-1919
after a series of newspaper reports uncovered a plot to send bombs through the
mail to prominent political leaders. Suspicions immediately fell on communist
party members, and U.S. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer launched a series
of raids on suspected subversive organizations across the country. Besides
employing coercive and illegal practices such as break-ins and warrantless arrests,
Palmer targeted foreigners “because they could be deported through a purely
administrative process” made possible by the Alien Deportation Act of 1918.50 As
with the namesake of the 1950s Red Scare, Palmer’s aggressive pursuit of
communists eventually led to a backlash that brought a respite to the persecution
of political radicals. With the landslide election of Warren Harding as President in
1920, the American people were eager for a “return to normalcy.”51
The fears that drove the anti-immigrant and anti-communist responses during
the Great War resumed with ferocity in the 1940s. Of course, the most noteworthy
event of the Second World War concerning the denial of due process for
immigrants and citizens alike was the internment of over 120,000 Japanese and
Japanese-Americans. Antagonists of a conspiracy to engage in sabotage or
espionage came from the highest levels of the U.S. military, including Lt. General
John L. DeWitt, the commanding officer on the west coast, who convinced
47. In 1918, Congress amended Section 3 of the Espionage Act to include the criminalization of speech
abusive or disloyal to the U.S. government, which became known as the Sedition Act. GARRISON, supra note 42,
at 96. Burt Neuborne, The Role of Courts in Time of War, 29 NYU REV L & SOC. CHANGE 555, 558 (2005).
48. The free speech cases discussed here of course, but also the power of Congress to interrupt interstate
commerce, regulate labor disputes, set wages, raise an army through a compulsory draft, and prohibit the
consumption of alcohol. See GARRISON, supra note 42, at Chapter 3.
49. KENNEDY, supra note 41, at 86; GARRISON, supra note 42, at 103–4, 108–10.
50. KENNEDY, supra note 41, at 290. The Immigration Act of 1918. Sections 1 and 2 of the 1918
Immigration Act authorized the Department of Labor to arrest and deport aliens who are anarchists; aliens who
believe in or advocate the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States or of all forms
of law; aliens who disbelieve in or are opposed to all organized government; aliens who advocate or teach the
assassination of public officials; aliens who advocate or teach the unlawful destruction of property; aliens who
are members of or affiliated with any organization that entertains a belief in, teaches, or advocates the overthrow
by force or violence of the Government of the United States or of all forms of law, or that entertains a belief in,
teaches, or advocates the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States or of all forms
of law. H.R. 12402, ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012 (October 16, 1918).
51. GARRISON, supra note 42, at 115–16.
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President Roosevelt to sign Executive Order 9066. This now-infamous order
authorized the immediate imprisonment of Japanese-Americans residing on the
west coast. In support of Executive Order 9066, Congress passed its own law,
which placed a curfew on “all persons of Japanese ancestry in prescribed West
Coast military areas.”52 In both cases (the curfew and internment), the Supreme
Court upheld the government’s actions as a permissible use of their war powers.
Kiyoshi Hirabayashi challenged the curfew as racially discriminatory because it
applied only to those with Japanese ancestry, but the Court rejected that claim and
was satisfied with the military’s claim that “the danger of espionage and sabotage
. . . was imminent, and that the curfew order was an appropriate measure to meet
it.”53 Similarly, in Korematsu v. United States, the Court upheld the lawfulness of
internment as a military necessity.54
The Court remained consistent in its deference to the actions taken by
Congress and the Executive during the war in cases beyond the mistreatment of
Japanese-American citizens. In an example of what Shawn Fields calls “empty
formalism,” the court upheld the exclusion of Ellen Knauff, a German who fled
her country after the Nazi takeover of Germany, married a U.S. citizen, and
attempted to become a naturalized citizen.55 After U.S. Customs and Enforcement
denied her entry without a hearing, she sought a writ of habeas corpus, but the
courts refused her petition. The Supreme Court again invoked the authority of
national sovereignty to both exclude aliens or to submit the actions of the
immigration official to judicial review. The primacy of war and the confirmation
that simply having a procedure to remove or bar entry of an immigrant was
sufficient to qualify for “due process.” In the simplest language, the Court
declared, “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as
far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”56
Although Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes made the point that–insofar as
speech was concerned–some utterances that may be illegal during times of war
were permissible during peacetime, this did not hold true for the extension of due
process rights to aliens during peacetime.57 Just as the Russian Revolution of 1917
generated a Red Scare in U.S. domestic politics in the late 1910s, so too did
Russia’s emergence as a global superpower after the Second World War created
the conditions for a second, more prolonged Red Scare in the 1950s. One historian
describes the post-war era in America as one of immense hopefulness, particularly
in resolving long-standing ethnic and racial tensions. The horrors of World War II
and the Holocaust, the ideals of freedom and democracy extolled as justifications
52. Act of Congress of March 21, 1942, 56 Stat. 173.
53. Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 104 (1943); Celeste McCaw, A Never Ending State
of Emergency: The Danger of National Security in Emboldening the Color Line in America, 7 U. MIAMI RACE &
SOC. JUST. L. REV. 107, 111 (2017).
54. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 234 (1944); McCaw, supra note 51, at 114.
55. Fields, supra note 36, at 744.
56. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 70 S. Ct. 309 (1950); Motomura, supra note 32, at 555.
57. Schenck v. United States, 39 S. Ct. 247 (1919).
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for the war, the increased activism of the oppressed in the U.S. and in many former
colonial nations, left many liberals with “grand expectations” for the future.58 The
Warren Court fed into these hopes. Right from the start, with his fortuitous
ascendancy to Chief Justice, he managed a fractious court that seemed split on
desegregation, and proceeded to issue a host of rulings that “reflected and
accelerated one of the major trends of the era: the rise of rights-consciousness.”59
That hope merged with an optimism in the potential of the state to create a more
just and equitable society by addressing social tensions and economic disparities.
Nevertheless, there were countervailing forces in U.S. politics that were ready
to resist the federal government resuming its trajectory from the New Deal era of
growth and intervention in the everyday lives of citizens. This was especially true
in the context of race relations in the South. The massive resistance to
desegregation and the continued violence against black Americans frustrated
liberal hopes. The intensity and stakes of the Cold War, of course, contributed to a
conservative brand of politics that could be careless of civil liberties and muted
liberal leaders for fear of being labeled a communist sympathizer.60 These forces
were also reluctant to reverse the restrictions placed on immigration in 1924.
Just a year before the Warren Court era began, Congress passed the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“McCarran-Walter”), overriding
Truman’s veto in the process who derided the bill for being anti-immigrant and
reflecting the same racist sentiments that shaped the 1924 immigration bill. Despite
some “liberalizing elements” of the law, it was largely “part and parcel of the
second Red Scare” and reflected “the subordination of immigration policy to
foreign policy.” The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) kept the quota
system for European immigrants–with the majority of the allocation given to
northwest European countries–and eliminated the Asian exclusion provision of
previous immigration law, replacing it with an extremely modest allocation of one
hundred entries per country.61 The Senate sponsor of the bill, Nevada Senator
Patrick McCarran, was a leading nativist in Congress. Two years before the INA,
he led the passage of the Internal Security Act that barred entry to anyone who had
ever belonged to the Communist Party or similar radical groups and required
“subversive” domestic organizations to register with the Attorney General. Those
that did not face the possibility of investigation by the Subversive Activities
Control Board (“SACB”). Those implicated by the SACB could not hold
government jobs or apply for passports.62
Because the INA came from such a vocal opponent of immigration, it created
a sense that little would change as far as the demographic make-up or relative scale
of immigration. However, most observers overlooked and underestimated the
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
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extent to which the two quota exceptions would be utilized: immigration from the
Western Hemisphere and the spouses or minor children of U.S. citizens. Between
1952 and 1965, about 3.5 million immigrants arrived in the U.S., of which only
slightly more than one-third were quota immigrants.63
Thus, before the Warren Court period, the continued expansion of legislative
and executive power concerning immigration in times of war (hot or cold) in the
interest of “national security” led to nearly complete power in the admission and
deportation of aliens.64 From the nineteenth century to the twenty-first, the
Supreme Court has been willing to “overlook significant, deliberate constitutional
rights violations in deference to vaguely articulated national security interests” and
“still undergirds contemporary immigration law.”65
B. The Warren Court’s Immigration Due Process Cases
Our search of the immigration cases that raised issues of procedural due
process during the Warren Court yielded a total of twenty-nine opinions.66 These
decisions fell into eight broad categories: (1) the ability of government to rely on
immigration investigations in criminal prosecutions; (2) due process in asylum
cases; (3) due process of returning lawful permanent residents; (4) the right to seek
bail in immigration detention cases; (5) due process in immigration deportation
cases; (6) due process in immigration collateral consequences of deportation cases;
(7) due process in citizenship cases; and (8) due process in loss of citizenship cases.
Of these, the categories with the most decided cases were due process in
immigration deportation cases, due process in loss of citizenship cases, and due
process for returning lawful permanent residents. The mixed results of these cases
reveal that the Warren Court was most sympathetic to the rights of long-term
lawful permanent residents and those facing loss of citizenship. In broad strokes,
the Warren Court granted the relief sought by immigrants in 18 of the cases and
denied them in 10. Within these cases, there are seminal decisions that both
significantly denied due process to immigrants as well as those that established
important limits to these powers, each with lasting effects today.
Perhaps the best example of this is the Warren Court’s opinion in both the
infamous Mezei and Fleuti cases, decided in 1953 and 1963, respectively, both 5–
4 decisions. More than the decade that separates these decisions, the presence of
the Cold War in the earlier case meant that a lawful permanent resident of more
than 23 years who left to visit his dying mother in Romania would be treated as an
arriving alien after being stopped several times from coming back and given no
63. DANIELS, supra note 30, at 123.
64. Id. at 746.
65. Id. at 747; Chacón, supra note 35, at 1834; McCaw, supra note 51, at 109.
66. Our search on Westlaw was very broad as follows DA (aft 12-31-1952) & bef 01-01-1970 & alien
immigra!. This search yielded a total of 490 cases. We read each one but only considered actual opinions to
identify those that pertained to procedural due process for immigrants. We did not consider cases denied certiorari
or writ of mandamus (close to 200).
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due process rights to challenge his denial of entry based on his communist ties.67
In contrast, Fleuti, a post-Cold War case, was much luckier since his history of
petty theft and his exit for two days to Mexico would not deny him his rights as a
lawful permanent resident of ten years when the government tried to charge him
as having a “psychopathic personality” for being gay.68 Fleuti would become an
important tool to spare other lawful permanent residents the same fate endured by
Mezei,69 but Mezei’s had an enduring fate beyond his own deportation. In the end,
Congress got the final word in 1996 when it codified which lawful permanent
residents would be treated as arriving aliens despite being previously admitted.70
Treatment as an arriving alien includes those gone more than six months but also
those leaving with certain types of criminal convictions or who engaged in any
illegal activity after departure.71 Scholars still debate whether Fleuti constrains this
definition in any way,72 but, even if it does, the effect is feeble. The more important
point, as illustrated by these two cases, is that the Warren Court both denied
significant due process rights to immigrants and was never bold in cementing
constitutional due process rights for immigrants when it did recognize these, at
least not in the same way it was for criminal defendants.
1. Immigration Investigations and Criminal Prosecutions
Only one case falls into this category. In Abel v. United States, another split
decision, the Court held that the results of a warrantless search conducted at a
criminal defendant’s residence (defendant lived in a hotel room) following his

67. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 219–20 (1953).
68. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 463 (1963).
69. Mezei, for example, is a widely cited case; 191 federal cases, nine of which are Supreme Court cases,
frequently cited to deny basic due process to persons treated as “arriving aliens.”
70. 8 USCA § 1101§ 101(a)(13)(C) reads: An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the
United States shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for purposes of the immigration
laws unless the alien(i) has abandoned or relinquished that status,
(ii) has been absent from the United States for a continuous period in excess of 180 days,
(iii) has engaged in illegal activity after having departed the United States,
(iv) has departed from the United States while under legal process seeking removal of the alien from the
United States, including removal proceedings under this chapter and extradition proceedings,
(v) has committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2) of this title, unless since such offense the
alien has been granted relief under section 1182(h) or 1229b(a) of this title, or
(vi) is attempting to enter at a time or place other than as designated by immigration officers or has not
been admitted to the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Elwin Griffith, Admission and Cancellation of Removal Under the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 979, 981 (2005); Kathrin S. Mautino, Entry: What Mama Never Told
You About Being There, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 911, 940 (1994); § 5:4. The Fleuti rule under IIRAIRA, Immigr.
Law & Crimes § 5:4; Kate Aschenbrenner, Beyond “Because I Said So”: Reconciling Civil Retroactivity Analysis
in Immigration Cases With A Protective Lenity Principle, 32 REV. LITIG. 147 (2013); Michelle Slayton, Interim
Decision No. 3333: The Brief, Casual, and Innocent Conundrum, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1029, 1030 (1999).
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arrest to commence his deportation were admissible in his subsequent trial.73 The
outcome in the case seems surprising, at least at a time when the Court seemed
more willing to hold police accountable for abuses of power. Yet, in Abel, while
pursuing the defendant–a foreign national–for espionage, the facts demonstrate
that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) worked strategically with
immigration agencies when it became evident it lacked probable cause to secure a
search warrant of his home precisely to take advantage of the more flexible rules
that applied in the immigration context.74 But perhaps we should not be entirely
surprised. The Warren Court did not appear bothered with pretextual uses of the
administrative power to pursue criminal law enforcement,75 nor did it think it
necessary a few years later–when deciding Camara v. Municipal Court–to impose
similar checks to administrative search warrants, even when these could lead to
criminal sanctions.76 The effect of this, of course, has been to encourage law
enforcement’s strategic use of the more flexible immigration investigative powers
to conduct criminal investigations against foreign nationals.77 Furthermore, and
this is also true in other areas of administrative law, the co-existence of civil and
criminal sanctions that flow from immigration violations today means that foreign
nationals can be investigated as immigrants but treated as criminals when charged
with immigration violations.78
2. Due Process in Asylum Cases
Only one case falls in this category. INS v. Stanisic raised the crucial question
about the type of hearing that an “alien crewman” should get after claiming he
would face persecution if returned to his native land.79 In this case, U.S.
immigration originally granted Stanisic, a Yugoslavian national, a landing permit
but later revoked it when a single immigration officer denied his claim to political
asylum.80 Stanisic was later successful before the Ninth Circuit in arguing that a
special inquiry officer should hear his claim to asylum, but the Court would reverse
this decision.81 During this time, Stanisic fit the common profile of thousands

73. 362 U.S. 217, 219–20 (1960).
74. Id. at 222–23.
75. See, e.g., Jeff D. May, Rob Duke, and Sean Gueco, Pretext Searches and Seizures: In Search of Solid
Ground, 30 ALASKA L. REV. 151, 178–84 (2013); see also, Margaret M. Lawton, The Road of Whren and Beyond:
Does the “Would Have” Test Work, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 917, 917 (2008).
76. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
77. See, e.g., Wadhia, supra note 3, at 13; see also David A. Harris, The War on Terror, Local Police, and
Immigration Enforcement: A Curious Tale of Police Power in Post-9/11 America, 38 RUTGERS L. J. 1, 4 (2006).
78. See, e.g., César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Deconstructing Crimmigration, 52 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 197, 222 (2018); see also Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and
Courts, 94 GEO. L. J. 1, 9 (2005).
79. 395 U.S. 62 (1969).
80. Id. at 66–67.
81. Id. at 72.
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coming to the United States to escape communist regimes.82 While Congress
passed laws during the Warren Court that opened the doors to certain asylum
seekers (i.e., the 1953 Refugee Relief Act), it was not until 1968 that it ratified the
1967 Protocol to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, but not the
underlying 1951 Refugee Convention itself. And, it was not until 1980 that it
incorporated the requirements of the 1967 Protocol into US law by enacting the
1980 Refugee Act, a law that conferred for the first time the right to seek asylum
from within the U.S. territory.83 Yet, the missed opportunity, including in Stanisic,
to grant these due process rights constitutional standing has made them vulnerable
to the types of massive violations we now see under President Trump’s treatment
of Central American asylum seekers.84
3. Due Process of Returning Lawful Permanent Residents
The Warren Court decided three of the four cases involving the due process
rights of returning lawful permanent residents, including Mezei,85 during the Cold
War. One of these cases was dismissed for lack of ripeness since it was the
workers’ union that brought suit preemptively attempting to prevent the
government from treating foreign national workers as “arriving aliens” upon on
temporary assignment in Alaska.86 Of the two cases decided on the merits, only in
one of these cases, Chew v. Colding,87 did the Warren Court refuse the
government’s treatment of petitioner as an arriving alien. The facts of that case
were compelling in favor of petitioner, and eight justices agreed. Chew, a Chinese
national, had been living in the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident for seven years,
was married to a U.S. citizen, and was a veteran who had applied for naturalization.
The Court drew a line when the government tried to treat him as an arriving alien
upon his return after four months away serving as a U.S. Coast Guard on a U.S.
merchant ship.88
The outcome in Chew stood in sharp contrast to the Mezei, from the same year.
In fact, both Chew and Mezei stood accused, based on undisclosed evidence, that
their entry into the U.S. would be prejudicial to the public interest. Mezei had been

82. Xiaojian Zhao, Immigration to the United States After 1945, OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIAS,
AMERICAN
HISTORY
(2016),
available
at
https://oxfordre.com/americanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore9780199329175-e-72 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
83. Kendall Coffey, The Due Process Right to Seek Asylum in the United States: The Immigration Dilemma
and Constitutional Controversy, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 303, 305 (2001).
84. Id.; see also B. Shaw Drake and Elizabeth Gibson, Vanishing Protection: Access to Asylum at the
Border, 21 CUNY L. REV. 91, 109 (2017).
85. See generally 345 U.S. at 206, 219–20.
86. International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemens’ Union, Local 37, et al., v. Boyd (INS), 347 U.S.
222, 224 (1954).
87. 344 U.S. 590, 591–95 (1953).
88. Id.
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a lawful permanent resident for 23 years and was also married to a U.S. citizen.89
Yet, although his prolonged absence from the U.S. (19 months) was in great part
due to his troubles securing an exit document, the Court would affirm the
government’s treatment of him as an arriving alien.90 In the fourth returning lawful
permanent resident case, Fleuti–decided nearly a decade after Mezei–the Warren
Court again rejected the arriving alien treatment applied to a Swiss gay national,
with a criminal history of petty theft, who left the U.S. for only two days to
vacation in Ensenada.91 In trying to reconcile these cases, the Court took great
lengths to distinguish the cases factually based on such factors as the circumstances
of their departures, length of time petitioners were gone, and whether, ultimately,
their departures were innocent. The Court would have been more honest to draw
lines based on national security, except doing so would have required deference in
cases in which the government refused to disclose the evidence against petitioners.
Why the Warren Court deferred in Mezei and not Chew is hard to explain when
Mezei arguably had greater stakes and was largely not at fault for his delays in
getting back home. Mezei, moreover, arguably would suffer a fate worse than
Chew and most certainly Fleuti since he was lingering in indefinite detention as
his efforts to secure a home in any other country had failed.92 How could, then, the
Warren Court pretend that the factors it constructed to distinguish Chew from
Mezei could make up for the fact that Mezei’s life was completely destroyed
without a hearing and without even knowing why? The Warren Court should have
been bold in its commitment to due process, but it was not. As a result, the feeble
gains in Chew and Fleuti granting certain returning lawful permanent residents
deserve some due process rights remains, although now as codified and modified
by statute.93 But, Mezei’s legacy to deny basic due process to many foreign
nationals remains. This includes the non-innocent lawful permanent residents who
depart the U.S.94 and those who have been paroled and are detained or living in the
U.S., no matter for how long.95 Mezei also foreshadowed the normalization to
today of state secrets, cursory proceedings, and other harsh treatment of foreign

89. 345 U.S. 206, 219–20 (1953).
90. Id. at 211.
91. 374 U.S. 449, 463 (1963).
92. Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff
and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PENN. L. REV. 933, 964–66 (1995).
93. See supra note 68 and accompanying text discussing 8 USCA § 1101(a)(13)(C).
94. Id. By statute, the non-innocent now includes anyone who commits any illegal offense after leaving
the U.S. but also anyone with a criminal history that would render that person inadmissible under the immigration
laws. This latter list is quite expansive. See, e.g., Rob Doersam, Punishing Harmless Conduct: Toward A New
Definition of “Moral Turpitude” in Immigration Law, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 547 (2018); Sara Salem, Should They Stay
or Should They Go: Rethinking the Use of Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude in Immigration Law, 70 FLA. L.
REV. 225 (2018); Frank George, On Moral Grounds: Denouncing the Board’s Framework for Identifying Crimes
of Moral Turpitude, 51 AKRON L. REV. 577 (2017); Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Drug Inadmissibility, 50 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 163 (2008).
95. See, e.g., Note, Allison Wexler, The Murky Depths of the Entry Fiction Doctrine: The Plight of
Inadmissible Aliens Post-Zadvydas, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2029 (2004).
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nationals perceived as national security threats.96
4. The Right to Seek Bail in Immigration Detention Cases
In two strongly worded opinions decided the same year, the Court in no
uncertain terms decided in favor of petitioners to overturn the immigration
agencies and grant them bail. Interestingly, both were Cold War cases, and both
involved removals of lawful permanent residents based on their alleged
associations with the Communist Party. In one case, Yanish v. Barber, a Russian
national who had already been ordered removed was denied bail while he awaited
the resolution of his writ of habeas challenging his removal.97 In its holding, the
Court acknowledged that the immigration law gave the Attorney General
discretion to grant or deny bail but that this power was subject to judicial review
for abuses of power.98 Then, the Court held in this case that the Attorney General
abused his powers by conditioning bail on petitioner’s renouncement of his beliefs
and associations with the Communist Party.99 Similarly, in Carlisle v. Landon, the
Court considered that it was an abuse of power for the Attorney General to deny
bail to petitioner, who was facing removal for his past communist membership,
based solely on this association.100 In each of these cases, the Court cites to the
Eighth Amendment for its authority to review administrative bail decisions. In
Carlisle v. Landon, the Court stated:
There is a constitutional question that lurks in every bail case. The
Eighth Amendment provides that ‘excessive bail’ shall not be
required. . . Requirement of bail in an amount that staggers the
imagination is obviously a denial of bail. It is the unreasoned
denial of bail that the Constitution condemns. The discretion to
hold without bail is not absolute. If it were, we would have our
own model of the police state which looms on the international
horizon as mankind’s greatest modern threat.101
Despite the strong constitutional language in these cases, it did not yield
constitutional safeguards against the significant adoption of mandatory detention
in subsequent immigration legislation.102 Nor did these cases protect immigrants
96. See, e.g., Sudha Setty, Obama’s National Security Exceptionalism, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 91 (2016);
see also Emily C. Kendall, The Alien Terrorist Removal Court and Other National Security Measures You May
Have Never Heard Of, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 253 (2011).
97. 73 S. Ct. 1105 (1953).
98. Id. at 1108.
99. Id. at 1108–09.
100. 73 S. Ct. 1179 (1953).
101. Id. at 1182.
102. Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory Immigration Detention, 65
HASTINGS L. J. 363 (2014).
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from denials of bail with limited due process103 or from the imposition of excessive
bail.104 Today, the constitutional foundation of any limits on the immigration
detention power is still unsettled,105 even as immigration detention has grown
exponentially and started to look no different from criminal detention.106
5. Due Process in Immigration Deportation Cases
The Warren Court was most active in deciding cases–a total of 13–that raised
questions of due process rights for lawful permanent residents facing deportation.
The cases involved important questions of due process such as the right to judicial
review, the standard of proof applicable in deportation cases, and. the application
of post facto protections in deportation proceedings. Here, too, the results were
mixed.
The clearest decision in favor of petitioners was Woodby v. INS, which held
the burden of proof in deportation cases had to be clear and unequivocal evidence
as required by the Administrative Act, despite language in the National
Immigration Act of 1952 requiring only reasonable, substantial and probative
evidence.107 Woodby is unusual because the immigration statute did not trump the
stricter protections imposed by the Administrative Act, something that did not
similarly occur in the area of judicial review as discussed below. Woodby has had
staying power to today and has offered important due process protections to
immigrants.108
In contrast to Woodby, in the four cases deciding whether judicial review was
required in orders of deportation, the Court deferred to the statute over the
Administrative Procedure Act. As such, these cases yielded different outcomes
depending on the degree of judicial review that the relevant immigration laws
required at the time of the deportation. For example, in Heikilla v. Barber, the
Court held that under the 1917 Immigration Act, final orders of deportation were
only subject to habeas corpus review.109 In contrast, in two cases that involved
deportations regulated under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the
Court found that a final order of deportation and the denial of suspension of
103. See, e.g., Mary Holper, The Beast of Burden in Immigration Bond Hearings, 67 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 75 (2016); Note, Anthony R. Enriquez, Structural Due Process in Immigration Detention, 21 CUNY L.
REV. 35 (2017).
104. Michael K.T. Tan & Michael Kaufman, Jailing the Immigrant Poor: Hernandez v. Sessions, 21
CUNY L. REV. 69 (2017).
105. Whitney Chelgren, Preventive Detention Distorted: Why it is Unconstitutional to Detain Immigrants
Without Procedural Protections, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1477 (2011).
106. Comment, Megan Shields Casturo, Civil Immigration Detention: When Civil Detention Turns
Carceral, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 825 (2018).
107. 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
108. But see Hillary Gaston Walsh, Unequivocally Different: The Third Civil Standard of Proof, 66 U.
KAN. L. REV. 565 (2018) (discussing Circuit split between the Ninth and Sixth Circuits in the interpretation of
the Woodby standard).
109. See generally 345 U.S. 229 (1955).
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deportation both were subject to judicial review under the statute.110 Conversely,
the Court would affirm the Third Circuit’s rejection of jurisdiction to review the
agency’s denial of motions of stay post-removal in order to seek other
discretionary remedies as it was not subject to judicial review under the statute.111
The Court’s deferral to immigration statutes when an immigration decision
requires judicial review has resulted in Congress often moving to deny
immigration petitioners’ access to the courts.112
Denying ex post facto protections to lawful permanent residents facing
removal is another area with vast implications for immigrants facing removal for
crime. However, in two separate opinions, the Warren Court denied this protection
to two lawful permanent residents with significant stakes in the U.S. The first case
involved a lawful permanent resident convicted of a drug crime in 1925 whose
case did not trigger deportation until the passage of the Nationality Act of 1952.113
The second case involved a lawful permanent resident who had been in the U.S.
for over 35 years and had been pardoned for his 1935 blackmail crime, yet he was
still deportable under the Nationality Act of 1952 because it applied retroactively
and discounted pardons.114 The willingness of Congress to expand criminal
grounds for deportation and apply retroactively to immigrants continues to inflict
pain on long-term permanent residents, many of whom were young when they
committed crimes, have paid their debt to society, and face family separation and
permanent expulsion from the only country they know.115
Other areas of immigration over which the Warren Court would not intervene
to impose greater due process included claims of bias in the deportation
proceedings when the same agency acted as investigator and prosecutor,116 and
denials of discretionary relief to deportation even when these were the result of
secret proceedings,117 or based on proceedings that compelled disclosure of
incriminating facts.118 In contrast, the Warren Court did impose a right of judicial
review in cases that refused a motion to reopen an order of deportation for
reconsideration119 and compelled the agency to review petitioner’s suspension of
deportation application.120 The Warren Court also compelled the agency to order a
rehearing in a deportation case, finding bias based on the Attorney General’s public
110. Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217 (1963); Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955).
111. Chan Kwan Chung v. INS., 392 U.S. 642, (1968).
112. See, e.g., Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIG.
L. J. 595 (2009); Brian G. Slocum, Courts vs. the Political Branches: Immigration “Reform” and the Battle for
the Future of Immigration Law, 5 GEO. J. L. & POL’Y 509 (2007).
113. See generally 353 U.S. 692 (1957).
114. Lehmann v. U.S. ex rel Carson, 353 U.S. 685 (1965).
115. See, e.g., Lupe S. Salinas, Deportations, Removals, and the 1996 Immigration Act: A Modern Look
at the Ex Post Facto Clause, 22 B.U. INT’L L. J. 245 (2004).
116. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
117. Jay v. INS, 351 U.S. 345 (1956)
118. Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405 (1960).
119. Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U.S. 18 (1964).
120. Dessalernos v. Savoretti, 356 U.S. 269 (1958).
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statements prior to the hearing of wanting to get rid of “unsavory characters” and
making public a list of 100 names that included petitioner.121
6. Due Process in Immigration Deportation Collateral Consequences Cases
Only one case falls in this category. In Fleming v. Nestor, the Court held that
the termination of social security benefits following the deportation of a lawful
permanent resident, based on past membership with a communist party, did not
require review by a three-judge panel as opposed to a single district court judge.122
7. Due Process in Citizenship Cases
In the two cases involving the conferral of citizenship, the Court granted the
petitioners’ due process requests. In Brownell v. We Shung, the Court held that
Shung, a Chinese national claiming to be a U.S. citizen by virtue of jus sanguinis,
was entitled to either a declaratory judgment, habeas corpus, or both.123 Then, in
Thompson v. INS, the Court adopted a flexible rule on time to appeal a
naturalization case because of the stakes involved.124
8. Due Process in Loss of Citizenship Cases
The Warren Court was also quite concerned with the due process rights of U.S.
citizens facing denaturalization or repatriation, deciding all five cases in favor of
petitioners. In Gonzalez v. Landon, the Warren Court held that the government
must meet the high standard of clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence in
cases involving expatriation, the same standard applying to denaturalization
cases.125 In U.S. v. Zucca, the Court read the denaturalization statute strictly to
require the Attorney General to enter an affidavit of good cause prior to proceeding
with denaturalization.126 In Rusk v. Cort, the Court held that a U.S.-born citizen
who left to England and refused to respond to the draft was entitled to the same
due process protections for citizens still inside the U.S. who lost their
citizenship.127 In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the Court declared
unconstitutional a statute that denationalized citizens for evading the draft because
it failed to provide sufficient due process under the 5th and 6th Amendments for
essentially punitive measures.128 Finally, in Scheider v. Rusk, the Court held that
only a three-judge panel, and not a single judge, possessed the power to dismiss an
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

U.S. ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
363 U.S. 603 (1960).
352 U.S. 180 (1956).
375 U.S. 394 (1964).
350 U.S. 920 (1955).
351 U.S. 91 (1956).
369 U.S. 367 (1962), abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 97 S. Ct. 980 (1977).
372 U.S. 144 (1963).
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action raising constitutional questions involving deprivation of nationality through
denaturalization.129
II. THE STATUS OF THE IMMIGRATION PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION
FIFTY YEARS AFTER THE WARREN COURT
Thus, while sympathetic to immigrants’ due process in important ways at a
time when immigrants faced significant tribulations from harsh immigration laws
and enforcement, the Warren Court did not provide much of a due process
resolution for immigrants in the end. Indeed, in some areas—such as the treatment
of immigrants deemed excludable, even those with significant ties to the United
States, such as Mezei—the Warren Court significantly expanded immigration
law’s exceptionalism in ways that have had a lasting legacy. For example, in 2015,
the Court also cited to Mezei when it held that a U.S. citizen could not challenge
the denial of a family-based visa to her husband based on secret evidence that he
would represent a national security risk if admitted.130 Also, the Court cited to
Mezei in 2018 to hold that the immigration statutes could not be read as imposing
a six-month limit on the detention without bail or a bond hearing of foreign
nationals seeking entry into the United States.131 While the Court did not cite to
Mezei when it affirmed President Trump’s power to enact the travel ban against
six predominantly Muslim nations in 2018, Mezei is certainly relevant in having
established a near-absolute power to keep foreign nationals out–even those with
close family relations in the United States.132
In this context, the answer to the question of how immigrants are faring in
terms of procedural due process rights fifty years after the Warren due process
revolution seems rather bleak. However, despite these significant recent setbacks,
the road to where immigrants are today regarding procedural due process has not
been linear and is therefore more nuanced, and perhaps even more hopeful. In
general, we see three important trends in attempts to expand the procedural due
process rights of immigrants which may still have sustaining power. Interestingly,
each of these trends can also attribute positive impact on the Warren Court’s due
process precedents, both those that applied to criminal defendants and those that
started to carve out important areas of immigration law a non-exceptional.
The first of these trends is what we broadly call the domestication of
immigration law. By this we mean that immigration law’s exceptionalism, the socalled plenary power doctrine, at least in the area of procedural due process, has
not applied equally to those inside the U.S. territory who can demonstrate
significant stakes that included liberty or property interests. In general, greater due
process rights, which are arguably required by or at a minimum deeply informed
129.
130.
131.
132.
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by constitutional norms, apply to immigrants who live in the United States,
irrespective of the circumstances of their entry. As we documented in Part I.B.,
this trend was very present in the immigration decisions of the Warren Court, in
which lawful permanent residents especially, as well as those facing the loss of
citizenship, fared a better fate.
The second trend has occurred as a result of the persistent and expanding
imposition of punitive measures on immigrants in the enforcement of immigration
law. As we also documented in Part I.B., the harsh treatment of immigrants in ways
that are impossible to distinguish from criminal defendants is not new, and it was
most certainly present during the Warren Court period. What is new, however, is
that now, the rise of due process rights for criminal defendants during the Warren
Court period has provided a new constitutional framework to advance similar due
process rights for immigrants in at least three areas: to constrain as much as
possible immigration detention practices; to accord certain rights to immigrants in
criminal proceedings who face deportation as a result of the criminal proceedings;
and, to argue for a right to counsel, at least for a subset of immigrants facing
deportation. While the Warren Court did not directly recognize these types of
rights for immigrants, some positive effects from the criminal due process
revolution have spilled over to immigrants.
Finally, the third trend that contributes to the analysis of due process rights to
immigrants fifty years after the Warren Court is the rise in immigration federalism,
especially post-9/11.133 The rise in immigration federalism responded to deep
disagreements with federal immigration laws and policies, which raised
substantive and structural concerns that the federal government was encroaching
on state powers through immigration law.134 The results have certainly been mixed
for immigrants who have both gained greater rights or been treated worse by local
sovereigns.135 However, as we explore below, some of the strong push back has
been to improve the due process rights of immigrants as a direct result of the
enormous expansion of the effectiveness and scope of the federal immigration
enforcement powers since 9/11. Here too, localities have relied on the Warren
Court’s criminal due process framework to demand greater rights for immigrants.
A. The Domestication of Immigration Due Process
When teaching the plenary power doctrine to law students, immigration
professors draw important distinctions to frame a discussion of whether any
constitutional limits apply. At least three bedrock principles are helpful to separate
the immigration cases in which the plenary power is strongest–i.e., absolute to near
absolute–from those where it is weaker–i.e., some constitutional limits apply: (1)
133. KEVIN R. JOHNSON, RAQUEL ALDANA, BILL ONG HING, LETICIA M. SAUCEDO, AND ENID TRUCIOSHAYNES, Immigration Federalism, in UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRATION LAW 135–138 (3d ed. 2019).
134. See generally, id. at 135–219.
135. Id.
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the territoriality principle; (2) the distinctions between substantive and procedural
rights; and, (3) the relevance of war powers. Of these, the territoriality principle
guided the Warren Court’s immigration cases in ways that continue to provide
lasting protections, at least to some immigrants today.
The territoriality principle, the constitutional principle that the U.S.
Constitution applies differently to immigrants inside the U.S. as opposed to those
who seek entry, was certainly not new, but it took on greater meaning during the
Warren Court years. Immigration law has drawn clear demarcations to restrict the
reach of U.S. constitutional rights only to those who have made an entry to the
U.S. territory. This demarcation, in fact, is what left Mezei unprotected through a
series of legal fictions and factual conclusions: his departure from the U.S. broke
his ties to the U.S. territory (the factual conclusion),136 and his ongoing detention
in the U.S. (without end in sight) did not constitute a new entry such that he would
be treated as being outside the U.S. (the parole legal fiction).137 Interestingly, the
below dicta in Mezei became critical in trying to distance Mezei’s terrible fate from
that of other immigrants who could establish entry and presence in the U.S.:
It is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even
illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to
traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of
law (citations omitted). But an alien on the threshold of initial
entry stands on a different footing: ‘Whatever the procedure
authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien
denied entry is concerned’ (citations omitted).138
This critical outside/inside distinction mattered during the Warren Court to
recognize important rights, especially for lawful permanent residents and those
seeking citizenship or facing the loss of it.139 This legacy is still important today
and has combined with what has become known as the “stakes principle” in
immigration law to improve largely procedural due process rights for immigrants
inside the U.S., largely irrespective of immigration status.140 The stakes principle
essentially recognizes that over time immigrants living in the U.S. build significant
136. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text discussion the circumstances of Mezei’s departure
from the U.S.
137. See, e.g., M. Gavan Montague, Should Aliens Be Indefinitely Detained Under 8 U.S.C. S 1231?
Suspect Doctrines and Legal Fictions Come Under Renewed Scrutiny, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1439 (2001);
Ibrahim J. Wani, Truth, Strangers, and Fiction: The Illegitimate Uses of Legal Fiction in Immigration Law, 11
CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 67–75 (1989).
138. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212.
139. See generally supra Part I.B.
140. See, e.g., Matthew J. Linday, Disaggregating Immigration Law, 68 FLA. L. REV. 179 (2016); Stephen
Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.
Q. 925 (1995); see also Note and Comment, Alyssa Markenson, What’s at Stake?: Bluman v. Federal Election
Commission and the Incompatibility of the Stake-Based Federal Immigration Power and Freedom of Speech, 109
NW. U. L. REV. 209 (2015).
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social and economic ties that ought to matter to recognize how deportation affects
their liberty, property or life interests such that, at a minimum, due process rights
should guarantee them a fair process.141 Mezei’s dicta also strongly suggested that
territoriality + stakes principle applies also to those who establish presence and
build a life in the U.S., even after crossing the U.S. border without authorization.
In the decades that followed the Warren Court and pre-9/11, the territoriality
+ stakes principle combined with important civil rights developments expanding
equality and liberty interests in other areas to law (e.g., public benefits, criminal
law, family law, racial justice) attempt to rein in the immigration plenary power in
favor of greater protections for immigrants.142 For example, important
constitutional-like restrictions on the immigration detention power emerged,143 as
did constitutional-like scrutiny on certain discriminatory immigration practices
like gender discrimination in conferral of citizenship cases.144 In a seminal article
published by the Yale Law Journal, Hiroshi Motomura elegantly called this trend
in immigration law “phantom constitutional norms.”145 These cases did not always
yield the expected outcomes,146 but they did provide some hope that they signaled
the beginning of the end of near absolute immigration powers,147 or at a minimum,
a cultural shift that would make a return to the darker side of immigration powers
politically unfeasible.148
The September 11 attacks on the United States, however, largely put an end to
this optimism. Overwhelmingly, analysis of the nature of the immigration power
today highlight its exceptionalism both in terms of its absoluteness–i.e., the lack
of checks and balances imposed by the judiciary and increasingly by Congress over
executive action–but also in terms of its significant departure from fundamental

141. See, e.g., id.
142. See, e.g., Joseph Landau, Due Process and the Noncitizen: A Revolution Reconsidered, 47 CONN. L.
REV. 847 (879) (discussing the “Mathewsization” of immigration law); Kif Augustine-Adams, The Plenary
Power Doctrine After September 11, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701, 706–18 (2005) (discussing the constitutional
basis for limiting the immigration plenary power pre-9/11).
143. See, e.g., Michael Kagan, Plenary Power is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 MICH. L. REV.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21 (2015); David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention,
51 EMORY L. J.1003 (2002); David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens:
The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47 (2001).
144. See e.g., Martha F. Davis, Sex-Based Citizenship and the “New Rationality”, 80 ALB. L. REV. 851
(2016-2017); Rebecca L. Barnhart & Deborah Zalesne, Twin Pillars of Judicial Philosophy: The Impact of the
Ginsburg Collegiality and Gender Discrimination Principles on Her Separate Opinions Involving Gender
Discrimination, 7 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 275 (2004).
145. Motomura, supra note 32.
146. This was especially true in the derivative citizenship immigration cases where, despite the application
of intermediate scrutiny, the Court neither definitely apply the standard in INS v. Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53 (2001),
but also affirmed the validity of the gender discrimination as applied in the case in ways that worried Justice
O’Connor and other feminist scholars alike who viewed the results as watering down the intermediate scrutiny
standard beyond immigration cases. See, e.g., Comment, Kristin A. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family
in Morales-Santana, 131 HARV. L. REV. 170, 190–92 (2017).
147. See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 18 at 339; see also Chin, supra note 14 at 1.
148. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 18.
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civil rights.149 Undoubtedly, there is very little reason to be hopeful that the
territoriality + stakes doctrine will do much to curtail today’s immigration power.
The national security exceptionalism of the war on terror as applied once more to
immigrants already in the United States post 9/11, for example, had led to similar
types of abuses seen during the Cold War that were left largely untouched by the
courts.150 Also, the Supreme Court appears to have little appetite post 9/11 to
continue expanding the constitutional gains in limiting the immigration detention
power, while the racialized nature of immigration enforcement continues to grow
without a remedy in court.151 Even in the narrow gains of gender equality principles
as applied in derivative citizenship cases, the Court’s subsequent application of
intermediate scrutiny challenging the unfavorable treatment of fathers resulted
only in reducing rights for mothers.152 If this were not enough, one of the most
important battles occurring in immigration law today is whether the Warren
Court’s Mezei exceptionalism will extend to foreign nationals who are living in the
United States but cannot prove a presence in the United States for at least two
years.153 This possibility, while dormant for decades, had been codified as part of
the 1996 immigration laws, although only President Trump had opted to rely on
it.154 Now, the constitutionality of this law is being tested in the Courts with an
uncertain future given what many perceive as the rise of immigration’s
exceptionalism Post-9/11.155
None of the above, however, should be read as the death of due process
protections–or even substantive constitutional rights–for immigrants. Much of the
important precedent granting due process rights to immigrants during and after the
Warren Court period remain. More importantly, the values that gave rise to this
149. See, e.g., Wadhia, supra note 3; see also Lisa Sandoval, Race and Immigration Law: A Troubling
Marriage, 7 MOD. AM. 42 (2011).
150. See, e.g., Marvin L. Astrada, Fear & Loathing in the Current Political Context: The Incubus of
Securitizing Immigration, 32 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 169 (2018); Ellen C. Yarosshefsky, The Slow Erosion of
Adversary System: Article III Courts, FISA, CIPA, and Ethical Dilemmas, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS
J. 203 (2006).
151. See, e.g., Carrie Rosenbaum, Immigration Law’s Due Process Deficit and the Persistence of Plenary
Power, 28 BERKELEY LA RAZA L. J. 118 (2018).
152. See, e.g., Laura Murray-Tijan, Transmission of U.S. Citizenship to Children Born Abroad: Issues and
Cases in the Aftermath of Morales-Santana, 18–12 IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS 1 (2018); John Vlahoplus, Sessions
v. Morales-Santana, Beyond the Mean Remedy, 17 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 311 (2018).
153. See Bill Ong Hing, Entering the Trump ICE Age: Contextualizing The New Immigration Enforcement
Regime, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 253 (2018).
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Make the Road New York v. McAleenan, 405 F. Supp. 3d. 1 (2019) (granting preliminary
injunction to stall the application of expedited removal to certain undocumented immigrants under President
Trump’s Executive Order). Already, in 2004, President George W. Bush adopted regulations to extend the
application of “arriving alien” and expedited removal to anyone found within 100 miles of the U.S. border who
also could not prove having been in the country more than 14 days through regulation. Jennifer Lee Koh, When
Shadow Removals Collide: Searching for Solutions for the Legal Blackholes Created by Expedited Removal and
Reinstatement, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 337 (2018). Court challenges to this practice had yielded mixed results. See
e.g., Comment, Vanessa M. Garza, Unheard and Deported: The Unconstitutional Denial of Habeas Corpus in
Expedited Removal, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 881 (2019).
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precedent–that immigrants in the United States deserve protections as persons and
that their stakes should limit the sovereign’s absolute power to detain and deport
them–are powerful principles that continue (or should continue) to influence the
thinking of judges and policy-makers who must weigh how far to permit
immigration power’s reach.156 Insisting on these principles–in fact, building and
innovating upon these to expand constitutional protections for immigrants157–is
paramount in times of rule of law crisis when immigrants are at their most
vulnerable. Similar to what the Warren Court did for criminal defendants, this is a
time to be bold: to imagine an alternative rights-based future for immigration law,
even if its realization must wait.158
B. Crimmigration’s Rise and the Warren Due Process Revolution
In a 2011 article titled Deportation is Different, Professor Peter L. Markowitz
traced the origins of how U.S. immigration law received the label of civil as
opposed to criminal law.159 At the time of the Constitution’s framing, deportation
as a concept did not appear in U.S. law.160 Instead, banishment was the earliest
precursor to modern deportation. Banishment, a widely used form of criminal
punishment for citizens and noncitizens alike in ancient times,161 constituted the
sole historical common law practice in England and the United States by which
both citizens and noncitizens were expelled from the territory based on the
commission of crime.162
Starting in the late 1800s, however, in a series of important U.S. Supreme
Court cases involving Chinese immigrants in the United States, the treatment of
deportation as distinct from punishment became solidified and has remained
constant to today. In 1889, with the decision of Chae Chan Ping–or, the Chinese

156. See, e.g., Note, Jorge A. Solis, Detained Without Relief, 10 ALA. C.R. & C. L. L. REV. 357 (2019);
Note, Megan K. Bradley, Assessing the “Proper Judicial Role” in Reviewing Immigration Detention, 27 J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 137 (2017–18);
157. See, e.g., Bing Le, Constitutional Challenges to Courthouse Civil Arrests of Noncitizens, 43 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 295 (2019); Jason A. Cade, Judicial Review of Disproportionate (or Retaliatory)
Deportation, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1427 (2018); Note, Zainab A. Cheema, A Constitutional Case for
Extending Due Process to Asylum Seekers: Revisiting the Entry Fiction After Boumediene, 87 FORDHAM L. REV.
289 (2018); Alina Das, Administrative Constitutionalism in Immigration Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 485 (2018); Shalini
Bhargava Ray, Plenary Power and Animus in Immigration Law; 80 OHIO ST. L. J. 13 (2019); Shawn E. Fields,
From Guantanamo to Syria: The Extraterritorial Constitution in the Age of Extreme Vetting, 38 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1123 (2018).
158. See, e.g., Allison Crennen Dunlap, A Constitution that Starves, Beats, and Lashes (or the Plenary
Power Doctrine): Jennings v. Rodriguez and a Peek into Immigration Dissent History, 95 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE
95 (2018).
159. Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299 (2011).
160. Id. at 1308–11.
161. Id.
162. Id. The origins of the treatment of the immigration power as civil has been explored in several other
writings as well. See, e.g., Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the British
Practice of Banishment and its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L J. 115 (1999).
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Exclusion Case–the U.S. Supreme Court framed the federal government’s
immigration power as grounded in sovereignty and war powers and, thus, largely
immune from constitutional limits.163 Under its facts, the Chinese Exclusion Case
granted the federal government absolute power to exclude a long-term, returning
lawful permanent resident based on changes in law that occurred after his departure
without any due process rights and certainly not those that would have applied to
persons in criminal proceedings.164 Four years later, in the 1893 Fong You Ting
case, the U.S. Supreme Court applied the same breadth of powers to remove four
long-term lawful permanent residents still living in the United States but who
refused or could not secure the testimony of a “white witness” who could credibly
attest to their lawful presence in the United States.165 The petitioners, three Chinese
laundrymen, would face deportation–really banishment–from New York,166 the
place they had called home for decades, without the rights (4th, 5th, 6th and 8th
Amendments) that at least three dissenting Justices felt should have been given to
them.167 The dissenting Justices, and in particular Justice Brewer, could not
reconcile how the harshness of deportation as applied to long-term lawful
permanent residents could be treated as differently from punishment.168
Ironically, perhaps, only three years after the Court decided Fong Yue Ting,
the U.S. Supreme Court would find that four other Chinese nationals, including
Wong Wing, had been punished with 60 days of hard labor for failure to comply
with the same law, the Geary Act,169 which required them to produce a white
witness to legitimate their immigration status.170 Thus, in contrast to all other
Chinese nationals denied entry or banished from their home, those sentenced to
hard labor had a right to a judicial trial to adjudicate their guilt. To the Court, the
key distinction between a Fong Yue Ting and a Wong Wing turned not on the
harshness of deportation versus hard labor but rather on their intent: with hard
labor, Congress intended to punish Chinese nationals for violating the Geary Act,
whereas deportation’s purpose under the same law was solely a measure incident
to the sovereign’s powers to control the border especially against unwanted foreign
invasions like the Chinese.171
Deportation’s harshness, of course, has led several scholars to critique its

163. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
164. Id.
165. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). For a more comprehensive treatment of the
background to Fong Yue Ting, including the campaigns of civil rights resistance that emerged from Chinese
nationals against racist laws, see Gabriel J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting: The Origins of Plenary
Power, in IMMIGRATION STORIES, at 7–29 (Davis. A. Martin and Peter H. Schuck, eds. 2005).
166. Chin, supra note 163, at 17.
167. See generally The dissenting Justices included Brewer, Field and Fuller. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at
733–63.
168. See generally id. at 733.
169. Geary Act, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (May 5, 1892)
170. Wong Wing v. U.S., 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
171. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 981.
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treatment as non-punishment.172 This critique has intensified especially as scholars
have documented the ways in which immigration and criminal law have become
increasingly intertwined and indistinguishable, while still leaving significant
asymmetry in the rights that attach to immigrants in immigration proceedings
compared to defendants in criminal proceedings.173 This overlap between
immigration and crime–”crimmigration”–came early in the history of U.S.
immigration laws as illustrated by Wong Wing. Most scholars, however, situate its
exponential growth to the mid-1980s when Congress moved to substantially
expand the criminal grounds for removal.174 Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court’s
conflation of immigration law with federal war powers or national security–which
was also present in the early Chinese cases–and its abuse in U.S. wartime to
persecute perceived foreign enemies of the state have also raised significant
questions about the advisability of retaining an asymmetrical due process regime
in immigration versus criminal proceedings.175
During the Warren Court years, of course, both the harshness of deportation
as applied to long-term permanent residents and other newer developments of
crimmigration were present. The Warren Court, while sympathetic to the harms of
deportation,176 most certainly did not take the opportunity to treat deportation as
punishment. The most important illustration of this is the Court’s refusal to extend
ex post facto protections to lawful permanent residents who had been convicted of
crimes and served their time when these were not deportable offenses. The 1952
Immigration and Nationality Act (McCarren-Walter Act) added not only the socalled Red Scare provisions but also so-called social cleansing provisions which
categorized homosexuality and prostitution as crimes of moral turpitude and
included drug crimes as deportable offenses, applying these retroactively.177 Not
172. See, e.g., Beth Caldwell, Banishment for Life: Deportation of Juvenile Offenders as Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2261 (2013); Michael J. Wishnie, Proportionality: The Struggle for
Balance in U.S. Immigration Policy, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 431 (2011); Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the CivilCriminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289 (2008); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some
Thoughts about Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890 (2000); Robert Pauw, A New Look
at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections Must
Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305 (2000).
173. See, e.g., Stephen Legomsky, supra note 2 at 469; Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis:
Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship and
Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 611 (2003). For a
comprehensive treatment of the history of what has become known as crimmigration—the overlap between
immigration and crime—see Crimmigration, in UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRATION LAW, at Chapter 15 (Kevin
Johnson, et. al., 3d ed. 2019).
174. JOHNSON, supra note 171, at 559–60.
175. See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 35, at 1827; Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Reform,
National Security After September 11, and the Future of North American Integration, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1369
(2007).
176. See supra Part I.B.4 and 5 discussing the recognition of the right to bail in immigration detention
cases and due process in deportation proceedings involving lawful permanent residents.
177. See, e.g., Daniel M. Kowalski & Daniel C. Horne, Defending the Noncitizen, 24 COLO. LAW 2177
(1995); see also Gregory E. Fehlings, Deportation as a Consequence of a Court-Martial Conviction, 7 GEO.
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surprisingly, the retroactive application of deportable crimes has become quite
popular in immigration law with harsh consequences for long-term residents with
established ties in the U.S.178 As well, the Warren Court refused to curtail the
ability of law enforcement to rely on its more flexible administrative powers to
conduct criminal investigations, despite its predictable effect of watering down the
Warren Court’s important new criminal due process protections in criminal
investigations.179
The verdict, thus, would seem that the Warren Court largely failed immigrants
in the area of crimmigration. However, there are at least two ways in which the
criminal due process revolution led to important developments (albeit not yet
sufficient) to increase due process rights for immigrants that would not have
occurred without the Warren Court’s criminal due process revolution. First, the
Warren criminal due process revolution created the benchmark against which to
evaluate the due process guarantees available to immigrants in criminal
proceedings. For example, should the exclusionary remedy apply to tainted
evidence or confessions in deportation cases, or should immigrants get a right to
counsel? We are far from parity in these areas, especially if we only consider the
federal immigration power. For example, the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary
remedy applies, but only in particularly egregious violations180 and not at all to
tainted confessions.181 Similarly, limited right to counsel remedies have made their
way to federal court rulings in innovative ways in immigration cases.182 Yet,
undoubtedly, immigration scholars and advocates apply the strong rhetorical force
of the Warren Court’s criminal due process revolution arguing that the
convergence of immigration and crimmigration law today can no longer justify
this asymmetrical treatment.183 Furthermore, as explored in Part II.C. below, the
rise in immigration federalism has, at times, also led to increased due process
protections for immigrants that are deeply influenced by the Warren Court’s due
process revolution.
Second, the Warren Court’s due process revolution has influenced the
IMMIGR. L. J. 295 (1993).
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Deportation Proceedings, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 477 (2013).
181. See Anjana Malhotra, The Immigrant and Miranda, 66 SMU L. Rev. 277 (2013).
182. See, e.g., Ninth Circuit Finds Statutory Right to Counsel for Non-LPRs in Reasonable Fear
Proceedings Before an Immigration Judge, 96 No. 33, INTERPRETER RELEASES Art. 4 (2019); César Cuauhtémoc
García Hernández, Due Process and Immigrant Detainee Prison Transfers: Moving LPRs to Isolated Prisons
Violate Their Right to Counsel, 21 BERKELEY L. J. 17 (2011).
183. See, e.g., supra notes 144 and 145; see also Sandra E. Bahamonde, Due Process for U.S. Permanent
Residents: The Right to Counsel, 20 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 85 (2013); Comment, Shane T. Devins, Using the
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development of rights in the narrow space of blatant convergence of criminal law
and immigration: when an immigrant faces removal based on the commission or
conviction of crime. Treating deportation as a collateral consequence to crime,
courts did not recognize a right to counsel remedy when immigrants– often based
on the wrong advice by their defense lawyers–pled guilty to crimes without
realizing the immigration consequences of their plea. This all changed when the
U.S Supreme Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky that Padilla’s attorney engaged in
ineffective assistance of counsel when he wrongly told his client that pleading
guilty to marijuana trafficking and to a sentence of five years plus an additional
five years’ probation, would not have adverse immigration consequences.184 To
the contrary, the plea not only subjected Padilla to deportation, but it did so as an
aggravated felon under the immigration law, which triggered mandatory detention,
barred him from any relief from deportation, and excluded him from reentering the
U.S. for life, with the prospect of facing up to 20 years in jail if he tried.185 In
finding a Sixth Amendment violation, the Court reasoned:
We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe
“penalty,” but it is not in, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction.
Although removal proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is
nevertheless intimately related to the criminal process. Our law
has enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation
for nearly a century. And, importantly, recent changes in our
immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic result
for a broad class of noncitizens. Thus, we find it “most difficult”
to divorce the penalty from the conviction in the deportation
context. Moreover, we are quite confident that noncitizen
defendants facing a risk of deportation for a particular offense find
it even more difficult.186
Padilla has been considered both revolutionary and disappointing. A number
of scholars, for example, have written about Padilla’s potential for bridging the
due process gap between the treatment of deportation and punishment and also
potentially in expanding its holding to other types of collateral consequences.187 At
the same time, Padilla’s remedy to immigrants has been substantially narrowed by
making its application non-retroactive, limiting its application only in instances of
clear wrong advice, or declaring simple notice of the consequences as sufficient,
as opposed to meaningful representation.188 Despite these limitations, Padilla has
improved the plight of immigrants in criminal court proceedings and has even led
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
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to some innovations in the criminal defense of immigrants, developments which
would not have occurred without the Warren Court’s recognition of a right to
counsel in criminal proceedings in the first place.189
C. A Federalism Due Process Revolution for Immigrants?
A third impact of the Warren Court’s criminal due process revolution on
immigrants can be described as a voluntary devolution effect as states and
localities have moved to constrain the expansion of federal immigration
enforcement power locally. Since the 1990s, collaboration, whether voluntary or
imposed, between local law enforcement institutions and federal immigration
agencies, has grown exponential, sometimes, in ways that have split localities.190
Some states and localities have fully embraced this welcomed collaboration while
others have pushed back vehemently, relying, in part, on important criminal due
process principles that emerged during the Warren Court period.191 An example of
this is what Professor Christopher N. Lasch has called “rendition resistance”: the
refusal of certain localities to execute immigration detainers which raise
constitutional due process concerns over the prolonged detention of immigrants by
localities for purposes of immigration enforcement.192 Another type of due process
immigration federalism influenced by the Warren Court is the rise of local efforts
to fund and support a right to counsel for immigrants193 or to regulate those who
seek to provide it by imposing standards of representation and accountability.194 A
final example pertains to the ways in which forceful conceptions on the right to
privacy and other concerns over law enforcement abuses are leading many states
and localities to adopt sanctuary laws to push back against federal immigration
enforcement’s encroachment into the lives of immigrants.195
III. CONCLUSION
The Warren due process revolution could be characterized as a missed
opportunity when examined through the lens of immigrants and immigration law.
A deeper look reveals, however, that its influence has been broader and deeper and
is still, in fact, expanding and evolving in complex ways. The slow pace in which
189. See, e.g., Talia Pegeg & Ruben Loyo, Transforming Deportation Defense: Lessons Learned from the
First Public Defender Program for Detained Immigrants, 22 CUNY L. REV. 193 (2019).
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immigrants have gained rights, and the way that these rights seemingly remain
vulnerable to political forces, could suggest that the gains are not firmly grounded
in constitutional doctrine. Yet, perhaps because these rights rise often as counterresponses to these strong anti-immigrant forces and consist of both political and
judicial interventions, the hope remains that these could, in the long run, have
staying power.

665

